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WHEN CONGRESS PRACTICES MEDICINE:
How CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION OF MEDICAL
JUDGMENT MAY INFRINGE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Shannon L. Pedersen*
Current judicial practice gives a great deal of deference to
federal legislation in the absence of a possible infringement of a
fundamental right. However, legislation that broadly restricts the
availability of a medically-accepted treatment based on non-medical
grounds, such as the legislation upheld in the 2007 United States
Supreme Court decision Gonzales v. Carhart, poses a threat to the
health and well-being of individual citizens. A proposed flat ban on
therapeutic cloning is an example of how this sort of medical
legislation can even risk a patient's health well into the future by
restricting later access to undeveloped technologies. Although the
Supreme Court has recognized some fundamental rights in the area
of medicine, it has not yet recognized a right for a patient to submit
to safe and effective treatments to preserve her life or health on the
recommendation of her physician's reasonable medical judgment.
This Comment submits that both the "life" and "liberty" guaranteed
in the Due Process Clause encompass this right. I propose that this
right can meet the test outlined in Washington v. Glucksberg, but it is
further grounded in a textual foundation that can escape the
uncertainty of a Glucksberg analysis altogether. As a result, courts
should not uphold such legislation unless Congress demonstrates a
compelling government interest and the legislation is narrowly
tailored to meet that interest. Congressional legislation that seeks to
substitute its judgment for the physician's by banning medically and
scientifically-accepted modalities, or modalities that may prove safe
and effective in the future such as therapeutic cloning, on a basis
unrelated to safety or efficacy infringes this right.
* Managing Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 49; J.D. Candidate 2009, Santa Clara
University School of Law; B.S. Microbiology, cum laude, Oregon State University. Thank
you to the editors of the Touro Law Review for the opportunity to publish this Comment. I
am also indebted to Professor Kerry Macintosh for her invaluable advice and critique during
the drafting process.
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WHEN CONGRESS PRACTICES MEDICINE:
How CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION OF MEDICAL
JUDGMENT MAY INFRINGE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a future where scientists in the United Kingdom have
developed successful therapies for serious diseases using stem cell
lines cloned from individual patients.' Thorough clinical trials have
proven that these treatments are safe and effective, and thousands of
patients in the United Kingdom have obtained successful treatments.
Physicians and scientists in the United States consider the therapies
medically acceptable based on this clinical information. Yet, it is
illegal for a United States citizen to obtain such treatment because
Congress passed a comprehensive ban on human cloning that
included a ban on therapeutic cloning. Does a patient in the United
States whose life or health is at stake have any constitutional
challenge against this ban?
Although non-cloned stem cell therapy science is
undeveloped,2 the above scenario is not unlikely. Since the mid-
1800s, advances in medical science have transformed the practice of
medicine.3 Rather than often acting as an agent to degrade a patient's
1 See John A. Robertson, Embryo Culture and the "Culture of Life ": Constitutional Issues
in the Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 3, 4.
2 Id. at 4.
3 See, e.g., Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical
Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of
Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201,
209-10 (1999).
[Vol. 24
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health, medicine can now effect dramatic cures.4 It is likely that
today's discoveries will change the practice of medicine even more in
the coming decades.5 As new therapies become available, patients
will surely choose to utilize these treatments when appropriate to
preserve life and health. But what options might a patient in the
United States have if Congress legislates to ban specific safe and
effective modalities on moral or political grounds?
In Gonzales v. Carhart,6 the Supreme Court upheld
congressional legislation that criminalized a specific medical
technique. 7 Congress enacted the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
20038 after making dubious "findings of fact" that the procedure was
"never medically necessary." 9  The Court admitted that some of
Congress' findings were erroneous'0 and that evidence indicated the
procedure was sometimes the safest option for certain patients.1"
Nevertheless, the Court deferred to the congressional findings to hold
the ban constitutional even without a health exception, 12 unlike a
similar, previously decided case.' 3  The Court indicated that "the
State has a significant role to play in regulating the medical
4 Id.
5 See Maria Vacek Broadfoot, The Next Big Ideas, DuKE UNIV. OFFICE OF NEWS &
COMMC'NS, Aug. 29, 2006, http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/2006/08/bigidea.html.
6 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
Id. at 1619.
8 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
9 Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1635-38.
10 Id. at 1637-38.
' Id. at 1635.
12 Id. at 1637.
13 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (holding that a state law banning a
specific abortion procedure was unconstitutional for lacking a health exception).
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profession" 14 and the legislation was reasonable because safe
alternative modalities for abortions were available.
15
However, the Court failed to recognize that Congress
fundamentally lacks the context and capacity to "weigh medical
evidence adequately."' 6 Regardless of Congress' fact-finding power,
it simply "is not the appropriate forum for making complex medical
decisions."17  Congress frequently makes legislative decisions on
emotional and opportunistic bases rather than on a careful
consideration of evidence.' 8 Congress may also legislate on moral or
repugnance grounds.' 9 Although both state and federal regulatory
agencies "limit[] medicine's purposes in many ways, 2 ° Congress
should not direct "choices among procedures that are generally
accepted in medical practice.' Instead, individual patients, guided
by their physicians, should make the decision to submit to a safe and
effective treatment.22
The effect of this recent effort by Congress to interfere with a
patient's treatment extends beyond abortion.23 Continued judicial
deference to Congress on the question of medical appropriateness
14 Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1633.
1" Id. at 1638.
16 Jerome P. Kassirer, Practicing Medicine Without a License-The New Intrusions by
Congress, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1747, 1747 (1997).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1633.
20 M. Gregg Bloche, The Supreme Court and the Purposes of Medicine, 354 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 993, 993 (2006).
21 Jeffrey M. Drazen, Inserting Government between Patient and Physician, 350 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 178, 178 (2004).
22 Id.
23 George J. Annas, The Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2201,2206 (2007).
[Vol. 24
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will only increase public authority over the purposes of all medical
24 ha"practices. It has been said that abortion laws receive heightened
judicial scrutiny not because medicine is involved, but because such
laws infringe the right of "free reproductive self-determination or
autonomy. 25  However, politically-motivated congressional
legislation that seeks to substitute its judgment for the physician's by
banning a medically-accepted modality infringes rights of autonomy.
A flat ban on therapeutic cloning not based on whether the modality
is safe and effective is an example of such legislation.
"[C]onsidering the matter in light of the Constitution's guarantees of
fundamental individual liberty,, 26 as well as the Constitution's textual
protection of life,27 the Court should apply substantive due process
principles and invalidate a ban on therapeutic cloning unless
Congress demonstrates a compelling government interest and the
legislation is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
This Comment will discuss whether a patient has a
constitutional right to submit to a safe and effective medical
treatment to preserve his life or health as recommended by his
physician's reasonable medical judgment.28  Part II provides
information about therapeutic cloning 29 and the background of
current medical regulation at the state and federal levels. 30 This Part
24 See Bloche, supra note 20, at 995.
25 N.Y. State Ophthalmological Soc'y v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
26 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 921.
27 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life . . . without due
process of law .... ).
28 See infra Parts II-V.
29 See infra Part II.A.
30 See infra Part II.B.
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also details how courts review challenges to federal regulations,3
how courts find "new" fundamental rights,32 and two specific cases
addressing these issues.33 Part III indicates that the problem lies with
inappropriate congressional legislation and the current level of
judicial scrutiny.34 Furthermore, a continuation of this pattern by
sustaining a ban on therapeutic cloning violates both life and liberty
interests.35 Part IV evaluates how courts might find a fundamental
right for access to safe and effective treatments within the Due
Process Clause.36 This Part will also assess the practicality of
applying strict scrutiny analysis to existing medical regulations.37
Finally, this Comment will recommend that the Court recognize this
right to medically-accepted treatment as fundamental and apply strict
scrutiny to any law that threatens the right, including a flat ban on
therapeutic cloning.38
I. MEDICAL REGULATIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
A. What is Therapeutic Cloning?
Embryonic stem cells ("ESCs") are cells present in early-
stage embryos that have the potential to differentiate into any type of
human tissue.39 Some ESC research explores whether doctors could
3' See infra Part II.C.
32 See infra Part II.D.
3 See infra Part II.E.
34 See infra Part III.
3 See id.
36 See infra Parts IV.A-B.
" See infra Part IV.C.
38 See infra Part V.
39 See Russell Korobkin, Stem Cell Research and the Cloning Wars, 18 STAN. L & POL'Y
[Vol. 24
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use these differentiated ESCs to directly treat diseased or dead tissue
in a patient.4" However, a known problem with using ESCs to treat a
patient directly is that the patient's immune system may reject the
transplanted cells.41  Although recent research with adult somatic
(non-gamete) cells may solve this problem, the technology's infancy
and reliance on viral vectors requires further research.42 The other
option for avoiding most deleterious immune responses is therapeutic
cloning.43
Therapeutic cloning is the common name for therapies
derived from somatic cell nuclear transfer.44 This process involves
removing the nucleus from an egg cell and replacing it with the
nucleus from a somatic cell.45  The resulting egg is then a near
genetic match to the somatic cell donor.46 If a scientist stimulates the
egg to act as a new embryo to produce ESCs, the donor patient's
immune system should not reject the resultant tissue cells. 47
Presently, this technology is not yet available.48 However, scientists
may eventually develop the technology with continued research in
the field.49 If so, therapeutic cloning could provide a safe means to
effectively preserve a patient's life or health without "relying on...
REV. 161, 163 (2007).
40 Id. at 164.
41 Id. at 164-65.
42 See Skin transformed into stem cells, BBC NEWS, Nov. 20, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7101834.stm.
43 See Korobkin, supra note 39, at 165.
44 See id. at 168.
41 Id. at 165.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 165-66.
48 Korobkin, supra note 39, at 166.
49 Id.
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external force[s] that fight[]," rather than "harness the body's natural
healing powers. 50
B. Existing Federal Medical Regulations in the United
States
The government can properly regulate trades that "closely
concern the public health."'', For example, the government regulates
licensing and the business of medicine as well as "the sale of drugs
and devices. '52 Furthermore, since medical information is abundant,
"open discussion[s] of medical issues" amongst interested parties,
including the government, "promises to improve medical care., 53 As
a result, substantial regulations relating to physicians, drugs, and
devices appear at both the state and federal level.54
The regulation of professions has been considered a state
activity since the early years of the United States.55 In particular,
states have a broad ability to "regulate the practice of medicine"
through use of their general police power.56 This power allows the
states to adopt laws that are not prohibited by the Constitution.57
States recognized their ability to use this power for public health
disease control as early as the late 1700s, 58 but it was not until after
the Civil War that "states began to license physicians and . . .
50 Id. at 164.
51 Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910).
52 Drazen, supra note 21, at 178.
53 Kassirer, supra note 16, at 1747.
54 See id.
55 Richards, supra note 3, at 202.
56 Id. at201.
57 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 234 (3d ed.
Aspen Publishers 2006).
58 Richards, supra note 3, at 204-06.
800 [Vol. 24
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regulat[e] ... the practice of medicine."5 9 Today, state regulation of
medicine continues to include the areas of licensure and discipline of
medical professionals.
60
1. Federal Legislation
Congress can enact legislation affecting the practice of
medicine pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution.61
For example, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act through its Commerce Clause power.62 Within such.
statutes, Congress may grant authority to federal administrative
agencies to develop more specific rules.63 Congress can also pass
legislation that affects the practice of medicine in a more direct
fashion. One example of this sort of legislation is the Controlled
Substances Act,64 where Congress listed the specific drugs to appear
on the initial schedule for control.
65
In recent years, Congress has attempted to exert more control
on the practice of medicine through federal legislation. Some of
these attempts have directly affected the choices available to patients.
" Id. at 208.
60 See id. at 210. This Comment will not directly address the abundance of state
legislation and regulation regarding the practice of medicine. However, this Comment's
solution would affect state regulation of medicine because a state cannot legislate in
violation of a fundamental right.
61 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
62 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2000)); See 21 U.S.C. §331(a) (2000)
(prohibiting the introduction of adulterated products into interstate commerce).
63 See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
64 Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
65 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000). However, this schedule is updated on an annual basis at the
agency level. Id. § 812.
2008]
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For example, in 2005 Congress passed emergency legislation
applying only to a single person in an attempt to direct her medical
treatment. 66 Congress' bill banning a single abortion practice, upheld
in Gonzales v. Carhart, is yet another example of Congress' efforts to
establish greater authority over the practice of medicine.67 Members
of Congress have also repeatedly tried to pass legislation to ban both
reproductive and therapeutic cloning, 68 though as of this date such
attempts have been unsuccessful. 69 However, the proposed flat ban
con therapeutic cloning makes no distinction based on whether the
treatment is deemed safe and effective.7°
2. Federal Administrative Rules
Federal administrative agency regulation of medical practice
is common. 71 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") is the "principal agency for protecting the health of all
Americans. 7 2  Two HHS agencies responsible for many federal
regulations affecting the practice of medicine are the Centers for
66 Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
The legislation gave Ms. Schiavo's parents standing to sue in federal court for the purposes
of de novo review of a constitutional claim regarding the removal of Ms. Shiavo's nutritional
support. Id. However, Congress' attempt to direct treatment ultimately failed because upon
review, the federal district court denied the parents' request for a temporary restraining
order. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1388 (M.D. Fla.
2005).
67 See infra Part II.E.2.
68 KERRY LYNN MACINTOSH, ILLEGAL BEINGS 76-78 (2005).
69 See, e.g., H.R. 2564, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1357, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 534,
108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (2001).
70 See Steven Goldberg, Cloning Matters: How Lawrence v. Texas Protects Therapeutic
Research, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 305, 308 (2004).
71 See Kassirer, supra note 16, at 1747.
72 HHS.gov, HHS: What We Do, http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html (last visited
Aug. 11, 2008).
802 [Vol. 24
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Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") and the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA").73  CMS promotes quality care for
beneficiaries of its programs.74 Meanwhile, the FDA is responsible
for ensuring the safety and efficacy of drugs, biologics, and medical
devices.75
Federal agencies regulating medicine do so based on a
congressional delegation of statutory authority.76 When Congress
passes complex legislation such as the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act,77 it delegates authority to an agency to create rules
necessary to carry out the requirements of the statute. 8 Although
there are many options for creating administrative rules,79 it is
common for agencies to conduct "notice and comment" rulemaking.80
This type of rulemaking requires that the agency give public notice of
the proposed rule and allow interested parties to submit comments.
The agency must consider these comments when creating the final
73 Id.
74 HHS.gov, CMS, Mission, Vision, Goals, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MissionVisionGoals/
(last visited Aug. 11, 2008).
75 FDA.gov, FDA's Mission Statement,
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2008).
76 See Am. Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) ("[l1t then becomes
constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency
which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.").
77 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)); see also Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 103 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.A. § 247d-5a (West 2007)).
78 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) ("Delegation of such
authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a
comparable congressional intent.").
79 See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006) (providing
procedures for agency rulemaking and adjudication).
'o 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West 2007).
8 5 U.S.C.A. § 553.
13
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rule.82 However, the agency does not have to adopt any comment
proposal and is limited in its ability to incorporate specific comments
in the final rule. 83 In addition, agencies make detenrminations based
on their existing rules that may have an effect on the practice of
medicine. 84 For example, the FDA approves New Drug Applications
("NDAs") based on the procedures and requirements the agency
adopted through rulemaking.
85
C. Judicial Review of Medical Regulations
1. Standard of Review
Regulations affecting health are often controversial.86 As a
result, regulations involving controversial practices, albeit medically-
accepted, are often disputed in the courts.87 Challenges to medical
regulations fail or succeed based on the level of review the reviewing
court applies. As with other laws, the applicable standard of review
depends on whether or not there is a fundamental right involved. 88 If
the reviewing court finds a fundamental right, then the court will
apply strict scrutiny to the law.89  On the other hand, if no
fundamental right is involved, the court will only apply a rational
82 5 U.S.C.A. § 553.
83 Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir. 1985) ("An
agency ... does not have carte blanche to establish a rule contrary to its original proposal
simply because it receives suggestions to alter it ... .
84 See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 554, 555, 558 (West 2007).
85 See generally 21 C.F.R. § 310 (2008) (pertaining to new drug approval processes).
86 Robert Steinbrook, Peer Review and Federal Regulations, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 103,
103 (2004).
87 See Bloche, supra note 20, at 993.
88 Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2001).
89 Id.
804 [Vol. 24
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basis review.9° Therefore, requiring that the court find a fundamental
interest before selecting the standard of review allows courts to avoid
balancing competing interests every time. 91 The requirements for
these two standards of review vary, as do their results.92
When the government infringes upon a fundamental right,
courts apply a stringent standard.93  Strict scrutiny requires the
government to first justify that the law serves a "compelling
government interest."94  If the state proves such an interest exists,
then it must also demonstrate that the law was "narrowly drawn" to
address only those compelling interests.95 Although strict scrutiny is
not always "fatal in fact,, 9 6 courts do find most laws unconstitutional
under this standard.97 Rarely, the Supreme Court has applied strict
scrutiny to cases involving medical treatment decisions.
98
Conversely, when a court finds that legislation does not
involve a fundamental interest, it will only conduct a rational basis
review.99 This standard requires that the court determine whether the
legislature's means are rationally related to a legitimate government
interest. 00 Unlike strict scrutiny, the government does not have to
show why its law meets this standard. Instead, the burden is on the
90 Id. at 948.
91 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
92 See Williams, 240 F.3d at 948.
93 Id.
14 Id. at 947.
9' Id. 948.
96 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)).
97 Williams, 240 F.3d at 948.
98 See infra text accompanying notes 122-27.
99 Williams, 240 F.3d at 948.
100 Id.
805
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challenger to prove that the law is not rationally-related to such an
interest.101 Furthermore, the interest does not even have to be the one
the legislature actually intended when enacting the law.'0 2 Therefore,
if there is "any reasonably conceivable" interest, a court will likely
find a law constitutional under rational basis review. 10 3 As a result,
unlike strict scrutiny, courts typically find most laws constitutional
when they apply a rational basis review.'
0 4
2. Judicial Deference to Legislature and
Agencies
When reviewing legislation, courts must ensure that Congress
did not attempt to alter the requirements of the Constitution by means
of the challenged law.'0 5 Although the judiciary will grant respect to
Congress as a coequal branch of government, courts will not defer to
Congress on constitutional questions.10 6 However, courts will choose
a reasonable alternative interpretation to federal statutes in order to
avoid finding them unconstitutional.'0 7  Courts give substantial
deference to Congress' "predictive judgments" but do not insulate
them from all review. 0 8 This deference occurs, in part, because of
Congress' ability to perform fact-finding that the judiciary lacks.'0 9
101 Id. (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993)).
102 Id.
103 Id. (quoting Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 314).
1"4 Williams, 240 F.3d at 948.
105 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
106 See Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973).
107 Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989).
108 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 665-66 (1994) (finding that
legislators often anticipate the impact of future events as part of the policymaking process).
109 See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989).
806 [Vol. 24
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has often deferred to the medical
community's understanding of its purposes, even in cases where the
Court ultimately treated federal law as controlling.ll 0
Judicial review of agency decision making is often reviewed
with great deference."' Generally, as long as the agency has not
exceeded its statutory mandate, courts review agency rules and orders
using an "arbitrary and capricious" standard." 2 This very deferential
standard of review upholds rulemaking unless the agency "relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider," did not
consider "an important aspect of the problem," explained the decision
in a way that "runs counter to the evidence before the agency," or "is
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or
the product of agency expertise."'" 13  In contrast, rules and orders
made through a formal hearing are reviewed using a "substantial
evidence" standard." 14 The substantial evidence standard is also quite
deferential." 5  If an agency action infringes a constitutional right,
however, courts will not maintain this deference. 116 Instead, courts
will make an independent assessment of the agency's action." 7
D. Finding New Fundamental Rights Under the Due
110 See Bloche, supra note 20, at 993-94 (referring to the Supreme Court's citations to
amicus briefs from physician organizations, including the American Medical Association in
a Fourth Amendment case).
111 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
112 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
"'3 Id. at 43.
114 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(E) (West 2007).
115 See Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) ("[A] reviewing
court is not barred from setting aside a... decision when it cannot conscientiously find that
the evidence supporting that decision is substantial .....
116 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(B) (West 2007).
117 Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 780 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Process Clause
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution declares that "[n]o person shall be ...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." ' 8
The Supreme Court has articulated that this clause protects an
individual from more than unfair governmental process and physical
restraint. 19  In this respect, liberty is a "rational continuum"
recognizing that "certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny
of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment." 120 However,
the Court has been reluctant to expand the concept of due process and
considers the question of new rights with the utmost care. 12'
The Court has found constitutionally-protected rights when
reviewing medical legislation involving contraceptives, 122 abortion, "'
and the right to refuse medical treatment.124 However, even in these
cases, the Court did not always indicate whether there was a
"fundamental" right. 25  In addition, the Court has only found an
affirmative right to medical treatment when the government denies
necessary medical treatment to prisoners. 126 Therefore, convincing
the Court to find a new fundamental right is a difficult proposition
118 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
119 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719.
120 Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 862 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
121 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
122 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
123 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
124 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
125 See id. at 278 (holding there was a "constitutionally protected liberty interest" rather
than specifically stating there was a fundamental right).
126 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note
57, at 818-19.
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because the Court has not always provided consistent criteria for
recognizing fundamental rights.1
27
1. Glucksberg's Two-Prong Test
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court articulated a two-
prong test for use when reviewing asserted liberty interests.128 The
Court declared that in order to find a new fundamental liberty right,
the right must meet two factors.129 First, history and tradition must
support the right. 30 Second, the challenger must carefully describe
the asserted right.' 3' Courts often address these prongs in reverse,
since consideration of whether a right is fundamental depends first on
the definition of that right.
32
The Supreme Court has stated that an asserted fundamental
liberty right must include a " 'careful description' of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest.' 33  The Court will not accept a
description it finds too broad and will often perform the substantive
due process analysis using a more narrow description of its own
creation.134  For example, in Cruzan, the Court did not evaluate
whether a person had a "right to die," but instead asked whether a
person had a "right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition."'
135
127 Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987,
989 (2002).
128 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-2 1.
129 Id. at 720.
130 Id. at 720-21.
131 Id. at 721.
132 See Raich, 500 F.3d at 863.
133 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
114 See id. at 722.
135 Id. at 722-23 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279).
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Other cases in recent jurisprudence lend support to the idea that a
court's definition of the asserted fundamental right will have a
significant impact on the outcome of a case. 136 If a right is described
too broadly, it can encompass too much, but if it is described too
narrowly, it may appear trivial. 131 It is possible that courts use this
prong of the Glucksberg test purposely to avoid acknowledging
asserted rights. 1
38
The Court has also noted that a right is protected as a
fundamental liberty interest only when supported by history and
tradition. 139 The right must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition" and " 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such
that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.'
,,140 Courts will look to history, state statutes, common law doctrine,
and cases on the subject to answer this question.1 4 ' This examination
closely depends on the court's previously determined definition of
the asserted right. 42  If the court redefines the right in a narrow
fashion, it is unlikely the court will go on to find the right is
historically protected. 43  In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court's
definition of the right as one "to commit suicide which itself includes
136 See, e.g., Raich, 500 F.3d at 864 (adding "the use of marijuana" to Raich's description
of the asserted right at issue, which narrowed the definition to such a degree that the court
did not find the asserted right to be fundamental).
137 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach
(AbigailAlliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
138 Id.
139 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
140 Id. (citations omitted).
141 See id. at 724.
142 See supra text accompanying note 134.
143 See, e.g., Raich, 500 F.3d at 866 (holding there was no fundamental right to use
marijuana medicinally).
810 [Vol. 24
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss4/4
2008] WHEN CONGRESS PRACTICES MEDICINE 811
a right to assistance in doing So'"144 led the Court to conclude that
history did not support this right. 1
45
2. Alternative Theories for Finding New Rights
The Glucksberg test articulated in the discussion above is not
the only method for finding a new fundamental right. Although
courts still apply this test,146 there are alternative theories for finding
new fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause. One theory is
still based on an interpretation of "liberty," while a second theory has
a more concrete textual basis.
In Lawrence v. Texas,' 47 the Supreme Court acknowledged
that "history and tradition" were not the ending point of a substantive
due process analysis. 148  Lawrence involved a state law that
criminalized sodomy between consenting, adult homosexuals, even
when done in the privacy of their own home. 149 The Court held the
law was unconstitutional because "[t]he liberty protected by the
Constitution" allowed homosexuals the choice to express themselves
intimately. 150 However, the Court did not explicitly hold there was a
fundamental right to homosexual sodomy. 151 Yet, the Court noted
that even if history does not indicate an interest as fundamental, "an
emerging awareness" of a liberty interest in modem times might
144 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
141 Id. at 728.
146 See infra Part II.E.
14' 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
148 Id. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
149 Id. at 562-63.
"0 Id. at 558.
151 Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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require protection of an asserted right.152  In particular, the Court
explained "the fact that the governing majority . . . has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice."'
5 3
The decision in Lawrence was also based on the already-
recognized fundamental privacy interest.154 In Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court noted that "[a]t the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."' 155 A
challenger might convince a court to recognize a new fundamental
right on similar privacy grounds. However, courts have not yet
accepted that medical decisions outside of the procreation and
contraception contexts fall within the realm of "personal decisions"
constitutionally protected as privacy interests. 156 Meanwhile, courts
have continued to use the two-prong test from Glucksberg for other
medical decisions. 57  For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals used the Glucksberg test in Raich to hold that there was no
fundamental right to use medical marijuana. 158  The court
acknowledged that the Lawrence framework might apply in the case,
but denied finding a fundamental right since "the use of medical
marijuana ha[d] not obtained the degree of recognition today [as]
152 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. The Court did not apply strict scrutiny to the challenged
law, but instead found that the law furthered no legitimate state interest. Id. at 578.
153 Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
1' See id. at 578-79.
155 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851.
156 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
157 See, e.g., AbigailAlliance II, 495 F.3d at 702-03; Raich, 500 F.3d at 862-63.
158 Raich, 500 F.3d. at 866.
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private sexual conduct.' 1
59
In addition to "liberty," the Due Process Clause also explicitly
protects "life."' 6 °  All other constitutional rights, including those
recognized as fundamental under the due process liberty interest,
depend on the ability to stay alive. 16' Therefore, it is arguable that
courts should require "[s]tate deprivation of life" to have at least the
same justification as required for other fundamental liberty
deprivations. 62 A corollary right is the right to preserve one's life.
163
This concept is supported by sources from the founding of the United
States, establishing the defense of life as a "natural right."'
164
The textual hook for "life" in the Due Process Clause itself is
important because of the Court's skepticism when reviewing asserted
liberty rights. 65  Unlike the right to privacy that the Court has
recognized in some situations, the asserted right to preserve life is not
a "second derivative" of liberty.' 66 This is an important distinction
because the Court's prevailing opinion is to deny protection for an
unenumerated right unless it meets the two-part Glucksberg test. 1
67
However, the Glucksberg test may be unduly restrictive when a right
is expressly stated in the Constitution. 168 Enumerated rights should
not trigger concerns about unwarranted judicial expansion of
"9 Id.at 865.
160 See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 1, at 9.
161 See id.
162 Seeid. at9-10.
163 Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 714 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
164 Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1819 (2007).
165 See Abigail Alliance I, 495 F.3d at 722 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
166 Id.
167 See Korobkin, supra note 39, at 183.
168 Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 716 n. 1 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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substantive due process rights.169
E. Judicial Review Results
Federal courts have heard many cases involving challenges to
medically-related federal laws and agency regulations. This section
will examine two cases in particular that exemplify the current
jurisprudence in the area of medical decisions and fundamental
rights. The first case pertains to administrative agency regulations
while the second is about direct federal legislation. In both cases, the
courts involved did not find that government action infringed
fundamental rights.
1. Federal Administrative Law: Abigail Alliance
In Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs
v. von Eschenbach, an en banc panel from the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit declined to hold that a terminally-ill
patient had a fundamental right to use experimental drugs that had
passed the initial stage of clinical .testing.170  The decision was the
result of a rehearing of the case after a three-judge panel found that
the right did exist.17' Assuming the definition of the right was
carefully described, 72 the court focused its inquiry on whether the
169 See id. at 722.
170 Id. at 701.
171 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach
(Abigail Alliance 1), 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, Abigail Alliance II, 495
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The dissenting judge in this case wrote the majority opinion for
the subsequent en bane panel. Id. at 697.
172 The court expressed doubt that it was carefully described since the right depended on a
regulatory determination that was subject to change. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 702,
703 n.6.
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purported right was "deeply rooted in this Nation's history, tradition,
and practices.' ' 173 The court chose to consider whether there was a
historical right of access to drugs not yet deemed safe or effective.
174
After conducting a historical review, the court determined
there was a long history of government regulation of the safety and
efficacy risks of drugs.1 75 The court admitted that the specific FDA
regulations involved were recent, 176 and a lack of historical
governmental interference "might be some evidence that a right is
deeply rooted."' 177 However, the court believed that "the lack of prior
governmental regulation of an activity tells us little about whether the
activity merits constitutional protection. 1 78 The court then decided
that the Alliance had not provided evidence that weighed the
historical question in favor of finding a fundamental right. 179  In
particular, the court noted that the drugs the Alliance wanted access
to were merely potentially life-saving because they had no proven
therapeutic effect. 80  The court stated, however, that it would "not
address the broader question of whether access to medicine might
ever implicate fundamental rights."'
181
Since the court did not find a fundamental right, it applied
'7 Id. at 703.
174 Id. The appellants focused their argument on the theory that there was no history of
governmental interference with a doctor's judgment about the efficacy of a drug. Id.
171 Id. at 703-06.
176 Id. at 705-06.
177 AbigailAlliance II, 495 F.3d at 706.
178 Id. at 707. The court also expressed concern that finding constitutional rights based
only on a lack of historical regulation would undermine the modem administrative state. Id.
179 Id. at 711. The court also declined to find a fundamental right based on the appellant's
common law arguments of necessity, intentional interference with rescue, and self-defense.
Id. at 707-09.
'80 Id. at 710.
11Id. at 70 1.
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rational basis review to the regulation.' 82  The court held that the
government's legitimate interest in protecting patients from unsafe
drugs was rationally related to the regulation limiting access to
experimental drugs. 83  Furthermore, the court indicated that the
legislative branch was more appropriate to balance the interests of
medical technology, and that its decisions were entitled to
deference.' 
84
The dissent'8 5 vehemently disagreed with the majority's
finding.' 86  It believed that the majority mistakenly combined the
analysis of whether there was a fundamental right with whether the
government's regulation would survive strict scrutiny. 87 Instead, the
dissent would have first examined if there was a fundamental right
"to preserve one's life," and only after finding such a right would it
consider whether the government's justification for infringing on that
right was constitutional.'88 The dissent pointed out that the FDA's
regulatory authority did not extend to physicians, and that the FDA
did not prohibit off-label use of regulated drugs. 189 Furthermore,
FDA regulations historically addressed restrictions due to
misbranding and adulteration concerns rather than efficacy. 90
182 AbigailAlliance I, 495 F.3d at 712.
1' Id. at 713.
184 Id.
185 The same judge who wrote the majority opinion in the original three-panel decision,
Judge Griffith, wrote the dissenting opinion. See Abigail Alliance 1, 445 F.3d at 471.
186 Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 714 (Rogers, J., dissenting) ("The court's opinion
reflects a flawed conception of the right claimed.., and a stunning misunderstanding of the
stakes.").
187 Id.
118 Id. at 716.
189 Id. at 725-26.
190 Id. at 714.
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Ultimately, the dissent would have found a fundamental right because
there was not a "historical pedigree" of "encumbrances on the
treatment decisions of a patient and her physician."' 91
The dissent also believed that common law supported the
Alliance's asserted right of medical self-defense. 192 Limitations on
the use of common law did not mean the right did not exist, but rather
that competing government interests might sometimes support a
deprivation of the right. 93 The dissent also noted that this was not a
novel argument because the Supreme Court already protected the
right of a woman to have an abortion when her life or health was at
risk. 194 History showed that a woman's right to have an abortion as
medical self-defense was independent from her right to have an
abortion as a personal choice.' 95  The dissent also expressed
frustration that "the right to try to save one's life is left out in the cold
despite its textual anchor in the right to life."' 96
2. Congressional Legislation: Gonzales v.
Carhart
a. What Prompted Congressional
Action?
In 2000, the Supreme Court held in Stenberg v. Carhart that a
191 AbigailAlliance II, 495 F.3d at 726 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 718-19.
193 Id. at 719.
194 Id. The dissent believed that the holding in Gonzales v. Carhart, where the Court did
not require an exception for health, was not inapposite because there were other treatment
alternatives available in that case as well. Id. at 721.
19' Id. at 716-17.
196 Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 715.
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state law banning a particular modality of late-term abortion was
unconstitutional because it did not contain a health exception.197 The
Court reiterated that an exception was required "where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother." 198 The State of Nebraska argued
that the ban would never endanger a woman's health because other
safe alternative abortion methods were available. 99  The Court
disagreed, determining that the State did not prove that an exception
to the ban was never necessary and that there was "substantial
medical authority" indicating the ban might endanger the health of
some women.200  However, Justice Kennedy's dissent emphasized
that the statute advanced "critical state interests" and did not place an
undue burden upon a woman's right to an abortion. 20 1 Furthermore,
he believed that the state had a right to make a moral judgment
regarding the procedure.0 2
Congress responded to Stenberg by passing the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 ("Act").03 President George W. Bush
197 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930. The Court also held that the law created an undue burden
on a woman's right to choose an abortion. Id.
198 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 879) (alteration in original).
199 Id. at 931.
200 Id. at 937-38.
201 Id. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The state interests Justice Kennedy discusses
include an interest in protecting the "life of the unborn" and ensuring the compassion of the
medical profession. Id. at 961-62.
202 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 962 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2103 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2004)). A form of this bill passed both houses of
Congress twice in previous years, but was vetoed by President Clinton on both occasions and
the Senate was unable to override the vetoes. See H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.
1833, 104th Cong. (1995).
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signed the Act into law on November 5, 2003.204 It was the first time
Congress had ever banned an approved medical procedure.20 5 The
Act did have an exception for the life of the mother, but still did not
contain a health exception. 0 6 Even so, supporters of the Act believed
that courts would find the law constitutional, unlike the Nebraska law
at issue in Stenberg.207 The reason for this confidence was that
legislators added findings of fact to the bill stating that the banned
procedure was never medically necessary.20 8 According to the
findings, "overwhelming evidence . . . compiled at extensive
congressional hearings ... demonstrates that a partial-birth abortion
is never necessary to preserve the health of a woman, poses
significant health risks to a woman ... and is outside the standard of
medical care.,, 20 9  Not all members of Congress supported these
findings and instead introduced evidence into the record showing that
a health exception was warranted. 210 Nonetheless, an amendment in
the Senate to add a health exception did not pass 21 and the findings
204 Annas, supra note 23, at 2203.
205 149 CONG. REC. S11589-06, S 11597 (2003) (statement of Sen. Boxer) ("This is the
first time any Congress has ever outlawed a medical procedure that is supported by the
medical community.").
206 18 U.S.C. § 1531.
207 See 149 CONG. REC. S11589-06, S11591-S11596 (statement of Sen. Santorum)
("[T]here has never been a case introduced that has not been refuted [in so many] different
ways that suggests that this procedure is necessary for [the] health [of the mother].").
208 149 CONG. REC. S11589-06, S 11601 (statement of Sen. Murray) ("The authors of this
bill tried to get around the law of the land by inserting a section of congressional findings in
their unconstitutional bill.").
209 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(5), 117 Stat. 1201,
1202 (2003).
210 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S 11589-06, S11595 (statement of Sen. Boxer) ("With all due
respect to my colleague from Pennsylvania ...I trust an OB/GYN more than I do him
[Senator Santorum] on matters pertaining to a woman's health and her body.").
211 See 149 CONG. REC. S3608-01 (2003).
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remained in the bill.21 2
b. Judicial Review of the Ban
Multiple parties challenged the Act in several federal
213courts. All of the district courts and courts of appeals hearing the
challenges found the Act unconstitutional on either vagueness
grounds or due to the lack of a health exception.214 These courts did
not defer to Congress' finding that the banned procedure was never
medically necessary.1 5 Instead, the district courts evaluated evidence
from both sides during trial and found that the procedure was either
"sometimes[] the safest abortion procedure, '21 6 or that "a significant
body of medical opinion" found that the procedure had safety
advantages at least "for some women in some circumstances. 2t 7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
decisions of the lower courts.21 8 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
tracked his dissent from Stenberg.219  The Court first stated that the
government had a "legitimate and substantial interest in preserving
and promoting fetal life. ' 22° After determining that the Act was not
212 See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, § 2.
213 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007).
214 See Annas, supra note 23, at 2204.
215 Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1636.
216 Id. (quoting Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1017 (D. Neb. 2004)).
217 Id. (quoting Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 480 (S.D.N.Y.
2004)).
218 Id. at 1639.
219 See Annas, supra note 23, at 2204. In addition, the composition of the Court was
different than it had been for Stenberg; Chief Justice Roberts replaced Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Alito replaced Justice O'Connor. Id. at 2203. The two new justices
voted to uphold the law, shifting the previous 5-4 split to a similarly split opposing view. Id.
at 2204.
220 Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1626.
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unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, or facially invalid,22' the Court
decided that the ban did not create a substantial obstacle to
previability abortions.222
The Court based this decision in large part on the
congressional findings of fact accompanying the bill.223 Although the
Court confirmed that it "retain[ed] an independent constitutional duty
to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake, 224
it nevertheless deferred to the findings even though some were
erroneous. 225 The Court noted that Congress had the competence to
balance risks when "the regulation is rational and in pursuit of
legitimate ends. 226 The Court therefore accepted that Congress had
the power to ban a medically-accepted procedure227 in the face of
medical uncertainty.228 Furthermore, the Court declared that "[t]he
law need not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the course of
their medical practice, nor should it elevate their status above other
physicians in the medical community.,
229
Justice Ginsburg wrote a scathing dissent against what she
considered to be the majority's "flimsy and transparent justifications"
221 Id. at 1627.
222 Id. at 1632.
223 Id. at 1632-33. "The Act's purposes are set forth in recitals preceding its operative
provisions." Id. at 1632.
224 Id. at 1637.
225 Gonzales, 127 S. Ct at 1637-38. The Court provided two examples of erroneous
findings of fact: the banned procedure was never taught in medical schools and there was
medical consensus that the banned procedure was never medically necessary. Id.
226 Id. at 1638.
227 The fact that the procedure is taught at several major medical schools and is performed
at major medical institutions indicates it is within the standard of medically-accepted care.
See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1029 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
228 Gonzales, 127 S. Ct at 1638.
229 Id. at 1636.
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for finding the ban constitutional. 230  Her dissenting opinion
emphasized that the district courts' findings of fact were based on
more extensive medical and scientific evidence from better-qualified
witnesses than the congressional findings. 23' As a result, the lower
courts rejected Congress' findings as unsupported and
unreasonable.232 Justice Ginsburg agreed with the lower courts'
determinations, noting the significant medical authority finding the
banned procedure to be the safest method in some instances.233 She
further stated that the Court's decision "deprive[d] women of the
right to make an autonomous choice [about different procedures],
even at the expense of their safety.,
234
II. THE PROBLEM: LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
BASED ON NON-MEDICAL GROUNDS
After Gonzales v. Carhart, several members of the medical
community expressed concern about the decision's possible effect on
the practice of medicine as a whole.235 In particular, the concern was
that Congress was dictating what was, and what was not, appropriate
treatment without taking into consideration the best interests of a
specific patient. It is undeniable that Congress has a right to
230 Id. at 1646-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
231 See id. at 1644. For example, the district courts found the doctors, who testified that
the banned procedure was never medically necessary for health, had no training or
experience with the procedure. Id. at 1646.
232 Id. at 1645.
233 Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
234 Id. at 1649. "The very purpose of a health exception is to protect women in
exceptional cases." Id. at 1651.
235 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Drazen, Government in Medicine, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2195,
2195 (2007).
236 Id.
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regulate some aspects of medicine, but Congress should not have the
power to directly control a patient's ability to choose a safe and
effective treatment.237
Without recognition of a fundamental right, a congressional
ban on therapeutic cloning may inappropriately constrain a patient's
ability to receive appropriate treatments as recommended by her
physician in order to preserve her life or health. This is not a mere
hypothetical; Congress has made frequent attempts to ban both
reproductive and therapeutic cloning on moral and political
grounds.23 8 The bills have not passed to date because one side wants
a complete ban on all cloning, while the other side wants to maintain
the availability of therapeutic cloning.239  Recent scientific
developments24° may rally proponents of a comprehensive ban to act
sooner than later.241 However, if Congress does enact a flat ban,
would a court sustain the ban once therapeutic cloning was proven
safe and effective? If Congress prohibits a patient from submitting to
safe and effective therapeutic cloning treatments to preserve his life
or health, it may be impermissibly interfering with the fundamental
rights to liberty and life, especially when that legislation is based on
non-medical grounds.
237 See Brief for the Cato Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (Aug. 10, 2006) (No. 05-380). See also Linder v. United States,
268 U.S. 5 (1925).
238 See MACINTOSH, supra note 68, at 76-78.
239 Id. at 79.
240 Breakthrough in Primate Cloning, BBC NEWS, Nov. 14, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7094215.stm.
241 See generally Arthur Caplan, Monkey Cloning a Reason to Pause, Not Panic, MSNBC,
Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21755931 (discussing news of the first
successful cloning of monkey embryos).
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III. "CAN COURTS FIND A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO SAFE AND
EFFECTIVE MEDICAL TREATMENTS IN THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE?
It is true that most federal courts have declined to hold that a
person has "a constitutional right to obtain" particular medical
treatments that "the government has reasonably prohibited. 2 42 Most
of these cases, however, have involved licensure issues,2 43 positive
rights,244 and the use of controlled substances or other regulated
drugs. 245 Although Abigail Alliance I and Gonzales v. Carhart did
not find a fundamental right for the particular modalities involved in
those cases,246 the courts in both cases did not rule out future
challenges asserting a fundamental right to medical treatment.247  A
court can analyze the fundamental right to safe and effective
treatments in order to preserve one's life or health as recommended
by one's physician under several theories. Finding support for this
right is critical in order to ensure that any congressional ban on
therapeutic cloning is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest.
242 Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993).
243 Id. at 773 (articulating licensing requirements for acupuncturists).
244 See, e.g., N.Y. State Ophthalmological Soc'y., 854 F.2d at 1381 (concerning approval
requirements for Medicare billing of assistant cataract surgeons).
245 See, e.g., United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2004) (concerning illegal
distribution of controlled substances by a physician).
246 See discussion supra Part II.E.
247 See Abigail Alliance 11, 495 F.3d at 701 (noting that it was not addressing "whether
access to medicine might ever implicate fundamental rights"); Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1639
(holding that the act banning the procedure was open to an as-applied challenge).
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A. There is Support for the Right Using "Liberty"
and Glucksberg
The first consideration is whether Glucksberg's two-prong
test supports the right to use safe and effective treatments in order to
preserve one's life or health as a fundamental liberty interest.248 This
test does not apply to generalities, but a carefully-defined right might
withstand judicial scrutiny if properly supported by historical
evidence. 249 The right of a patient to submit to safe and effective
treatments to preserve his life or health as recommended by his
physician's reasonable medical judgment is both narrow and
grounded in the tradition of the practice of medicine.
1. A Narrow Description of the Right
The right, as described above, arguably meets the first prong
of the Glucksberg test because it is narrow and carefully described. It
only applies to the use of safe and effective medical treatments, rather
than to any and all treatments that do not have any basis in science or
medicine. This definition is not too broad because it does not include
all medical decisions, but rather only the decision of a patient to
submit to a medically-approved treatment to preserve his life or
health. °
The definition also avoids problems that have plagued other
attempts to find fundamental rights for medical decisions. It does not
248 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
249 Id. at 722. See also discussion supra Part II.D.1.
250 But see N.Y. State Ophthalmological Soc'y., 854 F.2d at 1389 ("We disagree that the
constitutional right to privacy comprehensively protects all choices made by patients and
their physicians .... ").
825
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ask to protect the decision to use experimental modalities that "have
not been proven safe and effective." 251 It does not involve the right to
use a controlled substance in a manner not allowed by other federal
laws.252 It does not involve the right to use a modality that has little
traditional medical support. 3 It also is a positive right; it does not
require the government to provide treatment, but only that the
government not interfere with treatment.5 4 Therefore, this definition
is not overbroad and seeks to protect only the right of a patient to
submit to a safe and effective (and therefore medically-accepted)
treatment, as recommended by her physician's reasonable judgment,
to preserve her life or health.
It is possible that a court may still attempt to redefine this
right even more narrowly to address the specific modality
involved.255 Courts may do this in an attempt to discipline its own
discretion and not needlessly recognize new fundamental rights. 6
However, by adding additional criteria, a court can make it more
difficult to show that history and tradition support the right. 7  In
fact, a court may simply be trying to redirect the inquiry to avoid
addressing a limited history of governmental restraint of a particular
251 See, e.g., AbigailAlliance II, 495 F.3d at 697 (access to experimental drugs).
252 Contra, e.g., Raich, 500 F.3d at 866 (medical marijuana).
253 Contra, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (physician-assisted suicide).
254 Contra, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (public funding for
abortions).
255 Even when a challenger defines the proposed right carefully, courts have still
sometimes decided to redefine the right. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 702;
Raich, 500 F.3d at 866.
256 See Sunstein, supra note 127, at 989.
257 Id. at991.
[Vol. 24
36
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss4/4
2008] WHEN CONGRESS PRACTICES MEDICINE 827
right.258 This redefinition problem is acute in regards to therapeutic
cloning. A court could choose to narrow further the right involved in
a challenge to a therapeutic cloning ban to "a right to safe and
effective therapeutic cloning" rather than "a right to safe and
effective medical treatments." A history-based analysis would fail
using such a specific definition unless the challenger could
demonstrate that medical acceptance of the modality alone was
evidence of historical support for therapeutic cloning. 9
Even with the broader definition, therapeutic cloning presents
a unique situation because this modality does not yet exist. Although
the court did not find a right to use experimental drugs in Abigail
Alliance II, it did not extend that holding to negate a right to those
drugs once they are deemed safe and effective. 260 The flat cloning
bans that have passed the United States House of Representatives in
recent years, however, would prohibit any research involving human
cloning. 61 Such a ban, if enacted, would prevent scientists in the
United States from developing data that may one day show that
therapeutic cloning is safe and effective. Without this data, and
consequent FDA approval, a fundamental right to safe and effective
medical treatments would not protect access to therapeutic cloning.
Yet other countries without such bans, such as the United Kingdom
and Singapore, will continue to make progress on the science.262
Once scientists overcome the current technical obstacles to
258 Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 723 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
259 Korobkin, supra note 39, at 184.
260 Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 711.
261 See MACINTOSH, supra note 68, at 76-80.
262 Robertson, supra note 1, at 3-4.
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therapeutic cloning, these nations will utilize the treatment and
develop the clinical trial data necessary to show it is safe and
effective.263 Companies can utilize this foreign data to support a New
Drug Application ("NDA") in the United States.264
Whether the FDA would approve a properly-supported NDA
for a safe and effective therapeutic cloning treatment in the face of a
flat cloning ban is an open question given the agency's increased
politicization. 265 The FDA "shall" approve a NDA if the application
meets a set of requirements, including clinical testing, that proves
there is "substantial evidence" of the drug's efficacy.266 Furthermore,
an applicant has the right to a hearing during this process.267 If the
application is denied, the applicant can challenge the decision in a
United States court of appeals, and the court will review the FDA's
decision under the substantial evidence standard.268  However,
applicants rarely take this step, and even if an applicant did, the
263 See Korobkin, supra note 39, at 175.
264 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.120, 314.106 (2008). Furthermore, the International Conference
on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human
Use ("ICH") is a collaborative effort between regulatory bodies in the United States, Japan,
and the European Union to increase the efficiency of development and registration of safe
and effective medicines, including the prevention of unnecessary duplication of human
clinical trials. See ICH Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-
254-1.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2008).
265 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 18. An example of FDA politicization of a medical
decision came in 2005 when the FDA refused to approve over-the-counter sales of an
emergency contraceptive for non-medical reasons. Id. at 18-19.
266 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d) (West 2008). Substantial evidence in this context means
"evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations ... by experts qualified
by scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness . . . on the basis of which it
could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it
purports... to have." 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d).
267 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d).
268 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(h). Substantial evidence here refers to the standard of review as
described in the Administrative Procedures Act, not the definition that appears in the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
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reviewing court is unlikely to question the FDA's scientific
conclusions.269 If a ban against therapeutic cloning fell under a
fundamental right, the court would instead review the applicant's
constitutional challenge with a more probing examination.270
However, even with appropriate clinical data, it is unknown whether
an applicant would pay the substantial application fees for the
purpose of triggering a constitutional challenge.27'
2. History and Tradition Support the Right
The right to submit to a safe and effective treatment to
preserve one's life or health is also grounded in history and tradition.
First, there is little history supporting the notion that Congress has the
power to ban a safe and effective medical treatment. 272  Second,
concepts of "ordered liberty" include a patient's reasonable
expectation that the government will not prevent her from using safe
and effective treatments that her doctor recommends to preserve her
health or life.273 As a result, allowing Congress to dictate medical
treatments without consideration of individual patient circumstances
has the potential to sacrifice both liberty and justice.274
Although the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart stated that
269 Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration's Use of Postmarketing (Phase
IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 334-35 (2006).
270 See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
271 The fee rate for NDAs requiring clinical data for fiscal year 2008 is $1,178,000.
Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2008, 72 Fed. Reg. 58103, 58105 (Oct. 12,
2007).
272 See Linder, 268 U.S. at 18.
273 See Leslie Pickering Francis, Consumer Expectations and Access to Health Care, 140
U. PA. L. REv. 1881, 1884-91 (1992).
274 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (discussing that the right must be rooted in the
"conscience of our people" (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
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Congress had the authority to regulate medical practice, it did not
identify any prior cases where Congress actually banned an entire
medical procedure. 275  Two historical cases the Court cited for
support were Jacobson v. Massachusetts276 and Lambert v.
Yellowley, 2" both cases from the early part of the twentieth century.
However, neither case truly supports the idea that the federal
government has the power to interfere with a patient's access to a
safe and effective treatment as recommended by her physician's
reasonable judgment, regardless of the effect on her health.
In Jacobson, the Court declined to find a state statute
requiring mandatory vaccinations for adults, when public health
officials deemed it necessary, was unconstitutional. 278 The challenger
was an adult who refused a smallpox vaccination although he was fit
for vaccination. 279 Although much of the case discussed how the
state legislature had the authority to choose between conflicting
medical opinions regarding the safety of vaccinations generally, the
Court was clear that it was not holding there was an "absolute rule
that an adult must be vaccinated if. . .that vaccination . . . would
seriously impair his health, or probably cause his death. 28°
In Lambert, the Court also declined to find a federal statute
unconstitutional limiting the amount of "spirituous liquor" a
275 Annas, supra note 23, at 2205.
276 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
277 272 U.S. 581 (1926).
278 See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39.
279 id.
280 Id. at 30-31, 39.
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physician could prescribe. 281 As in Jacobson, the Court discussed
conflicting views of the medicinal purposes of spirituous liquors.282
Even so, the reason for the case was to challenge whether Congress
had the power to pass such a law in furtherance of the Eighteenth
Amendment.283 In addition, the focus was on whether a physician
could prescribe amounts beyond the limits of the law, rather than
whether or not a patient had a right to receive greater amounts.284
Therefore, these cases do not support the idea that Congress has the
power to prohibit a patient from submitting to a safe and effective
medical treatment.
A history of respect for the concepts of bodily integrity and
self-determination further support a right to access safe and effective
medical treatments without unwarranted governmental
interference.285  These are not "abstract concepts of personal
autonomy," but rather specific rights that one can apply to acts to
preserve one's life or health.286 Bodily integrity centers on the
concept that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body. 2 87 The
281 Lambert, 272 U.S. at 594-95.
282 Id. at 589-90.
283 Id. at 589. The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the "manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors ... for beverage purposes .... U.S. CONST. amend.
XVIII, § 1 (repealed 1933).
284 Lambert, 272 U.S. at 596. The law was really intended to make sure that physicians
were not overprescribing alcohol as a pretext for making it available for beverage purposes.
Id. at 597.
285 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES * 129 (discussing the guarantee to
preserve one's health).
286 See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 716 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
287 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (finding that a
doctor's operation without the patient's informed consent amounted to trespass).
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government has an interest in preserving the health of its citizens, 288
and not all bodily acts that a person may wish to engage in are
constitutionally protected. 289  However, there are limits on the
government's ability to interfere with "a person's most basic
decisions about ... bodily integrity.,
291
If history supports the right of an adult to refuse safe and
effective treatments without governmental interference--even when
that treatment would preserve his life or health29 1-then that same
history also arguably supports the right of an adult to submit to safe
and effective treatments to preserve his life or health without undue
governmental interference.292 The majority in Abigail Alliance II
rejected a similar argument, noting that "a tradition protecting
individual freedom from life-saving, but forced, medical treatment
does not evidence a constitutional tradition of providing affirmative
access to a potentially harmful, and even fatal, commercial good.
2 93
However, this conclusion ignores the fact that the Supreme Court has
indicated support for bodily integrity arguments in situations where
the goal was not to preserve life or health. For example, in
Glucksberg, a majority of justices noted that their support assumed
that availability of palliative treatment might implicate liberty rights
even if it hastened death.294 The Abigail Alliance II majority's
overriding concern about potentially harmful drugs is also not at issue
288 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.
289 See, e.g., Raich, 500 F.3d at 850.
290 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 849 (internal citations omitted).
291 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
292 See Goldberg, supra note 70, at 310.
293 AbigailAlliance 11, 495 F.3d at 711 n.19.
294 Robertson, supra note 1, at 10.
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when the drug has been independently deemed safe and effective.
It is impossible to consider how a court might apply history to
a therapeutic cloning ban without returning to the discussion of
definition.295  If the court defines the right to include the specific
treatment, the government could argue that Congress' interest in
banning human cloning in recent years is a sign that history did not
support a right to this particular modality.296  However, since
therapeutic cloning does not yet exist, a flat ban is not based on any
evidence that the treatment will forever be unsafe or ineffective.
Even once therapeutic cloning is deemed safe and effective, there
will not be much "history" supporting such a novel treatment. If it is
not a requirement that a statute or common law specifically recognize
a fundamental right, then neither should courts require historical
evidence supporting a right to access safe and effective therapeutic
cloning in Abigail Alliance Ii.297
B. Alternative Theories Independently Support the
Right
Since the application of the Glucksberg test is highly
dependent on the court's definition of the asserted right, a challenger
may need to demonstrate the right exists using alternative theories.9
A challenger might argue that a tradition of confidentiality in the
295 See supra Part IV.A. 1.
296 See, e.g., H.R. 2564, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1357, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 534,
108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (2001). A similar argument appeared in Raich,
where the court found that the country "took an about-face" in regards to a history of
medical marijuana use when Congress passed the Controlled Substance Act in 1970. Raich,
500 F.3d at 865.
297 Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 722-23 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
298 See Raich, 500 F.3d at 864.
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physician-patient relationship supports a right to safe and effective
medical treatments just as those privacy rights already recognized by
the Court. 29 9 The Hippocratic Oath, traditionally taken by physicians,
includes a provision regarding the physician's duty to respect her
patient's privacy.3 °° Modem laws regarding exclusion of evidence of
physician-patient conversations 30 ' and protection of medical
records302 indicate that society places great weight on the privacy of
an individual's medical decisions. The Lawrence framework might,
therefore, apply because an "emerging awareness" exists in modem
times that use of safe and effective medical treatments, even those
that are completely novel, such as therapeutic cloning, is a
fundamental right.30 3 However, this argument would not likely
overcome the Court's limitation of medical privacy to procreation
and contraception contexts.30 4
The right to use safe and effective medical treatments is also
grounded in the textual due process right to life. The plain language
of the clause enumerates this right.30 5 The Court has also recognized
"that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life. '30 6 When an
299 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582.
300 See TABERS CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 991-92 (19th ed. 2001). The
Hippocratic Oath states in pertinent part: "Whatever, in connection with my professional
practice, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be
spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret." Id. at
992.
301 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 994 (West 2008).
302 See, e.g., Public Health and Welfare Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (b) (2000) (providing
penalties for wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information).
303 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
304 See supra text accompanying notes 156-59.
305 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
306 Abigail Alliance I, 495 F.3d at 727-28 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 281).
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internal condition threatens one's life or health, that person needs
external forces to intervene in order to restore health.3" 7 Safe and
effective medical treatments have, by definition, been proven to help
a person preserve her life or health. Even therapeutic cloning
"involve[s] efforts to avoid death and reduce suffering."308 It would
therefore be illogical for the government to be free to legislate in a
manner that threatened a person's life without a compelling
interest. 30 9 A court should not abdicate its judicial responsibility by
denying the importance of this express constitutional interest in
life.310
The common law doctrine of self-defense lends further weight
to why government restrictions to safe and effective medical
treatments may infringe the fundamental right to life. The right of a
person to take reasonable steps to preserve her life in the face of
death has been described as "an inherent right of man., 311  The
concept appears most often in regards to assaults by other people, but
its basic premise also applies when one's aggressor is instead a
312disease. When a person's life or health is seriously threatened by a
disease, she should have the opportunity to fight against that disease
in a reasonable manner. If her physician recommends that a
particular medically-accepted treatment is her best opportunity to
recover from that disease, she should have the right to submit to that
307 Korobkin, supra note 39, at 182.
308 Robertson, supra note 1, at 13.
309 See id. at 12.
310 Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 722 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
311 Id. at 717 (quoting People v. Pignatoro, 136 N.Y.S. 155, 160 (Magis. Ct. 1911)).
312 Id. at 717-18.
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treatment as an act of self-defense.31 3 Although the right to self-
defense is not unqualified,314 courts should subject government
restrictions that impose a substantial burden on the ability to protect
one's life through the use of safe and effective medical treatments to
a higher level of scrutiny.31 5
The concept of self-defense in the medical context is not
novel. For example, post-viability abortions allowed for life and
health reasons are not grounded in personal choice, but rather in self-
defense.316 In Roe v. Wade,317 the Court held that states could
"proscribe abortion [after fetal viability] . . . except when it is
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother., 31 8 The Court
reaffirmed this holding in both Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey and Stenberg v. Carhart.3'9 Even the Court in
Gonzales v. Carhart continued to recognize the government could not
proscribe specific abortion procedures if doing so posed a significant
risk to a woman's health. 32" The Court's jurisprudence in this area
repeatedly emphasizes that the right to an abortion is not only based
on choice. When an abortion is necessary to preserve one's life or
health, clearly that abortion is sought instead as an act of self-
defense.321
313 See id. at 721.
114 Id. at 717.
315 See Volokh, supra note 164, at 1827.
316 Id. at 1826.
317 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
318 Id. at 163-65.
319 See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 846; Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 931.
320 Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1635.
321 Since self-defense is a common law doctrine, it is also noteworthy that states have long
exempted from criminal statutes those abortions performed to save the life of the mother.
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Government restrictions regarding misbranded or adulterated
drugs are not inconsistent with the self-defense concept.322 Although
the majority in Abigail Alliance II rejected an argument of self-
defense, the court's holding was premised on the drug in question
being experimental.323 The court was clear that "[u]nlike the cases in
which the doctrine of self-defense might properly be invoked, this
case involves risks from drugs with no proven therapeutic effect.
324
Drugs which have been proven safe and effective through proper
clinical trials would have a proven therapeutic effect. Therefore,
courts should consider a patient's access to safe and effective medical
treatments to preserve her life and health as a cognizable act of self-
defense in pursuit of her right to life.
C. Do Practical Policy Considerations Negate
Application of Strict Scrutiny?
Courts have struck down legislation interfering with life and
health in the past. 325 However, any recognition of a new fundamental
right may have adverse effects on existing regulatory structures. If a
patient has a fundamental right to submit to a safe and effective
medical treatment to preserve her life or health, then courts would
subject any law or regulation enacted that interfered with this right to
strict scrutiny.32 6 Existing laws could face increased challenges on
grounds that there was no compelling government interest or that the
See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 721 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
322 Id. at 726.
323 Id. at 710 (majority opinion).
324 Id.
325 Robertson, supra note 1, at 14.
326 See discussion supra, Part II.C.1.
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law was not narrowly tailored. There may also be concerns that the
courts would not give the appropriate level of deference to legislative
or agency fact-finding. 327 However, these public policy concerns are
not great enough to deny recognition of this fundamental right,
especially since the government would not lose all power to regulate
medical treatments.328
First, in order for this right to apply in a particular case, it
must involve a governmental interference with a patient's decision to
submit to a safe and effective treatment. Legitimate laws and
regulations that restrict access to modalities not yet proven safe or
effective may not fall under the protection of this right.329  The
government has rarely attempted to directly interfere with the ability
of patients to submit to safe or effective medical treatments. 33' As
noted above, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 ("Act") was
the first time Congress completely banned a medically-accepted
procedure. 331 Although parties may file more suits, a court is likely
to prematurely dismiss a suit in the absence of legislative or agency
action interfering with access to a medically-accepted treatment.
There is also no reason why recognition of this right would cause
courts any greater difficulty in assessing "compelling interests" than
it does in other strict scrutiny matters.332
327 See Richmond, 488 U.S. at 500.
328 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 15.
329 The petitioners in Abigail Alliance I did try to argue the experimental drugs were safe
since they had passed the initial stage of clinical testing, but the court did not agree. Abigail
Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 703. Furthermore, FDA decisions denying approval of a drug could
be challenged. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (h).
330 Korobkin, supra note 39, at 180-81.
331 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
332 For example, courts apply strict scrutiny for challenges to laws on equal protection or
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Second, reducing the level of deference given to
congressional fact-finding in the area of medical practices is a proper
use of judicial oversight. In the past, courts have deferred to the
medical community's authority of what is considered proper medical
practice.333 Deference to Congress may be appropriate if Congress is
better equipped than the courts to arrive at the correct result.
334
Congressional fact-finding simply consists of reviewing oral and
written testimony.335 Furthermore, Congress can choose to invite
experts that meet their predetermined view of the facts to testify.
More so, in the "throes of politics," Congress may overlook basic
values.3 36 Therefore, it is likely that congressional legislation
regarding medical judgment and legitimate medical purposes will
reflect political goals rather than regulatory and honest public health
goals.
337
This political reality means that courts should be particularly
skeptical of congressional fact-finding for controversial medical
procedures. Justice Thomas, in his role as a Circuit Judge for the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, once said that "[i]f a
legislature could make a statute constitutional simply by 'finding'
that black is white or freedom, slavery, judicial review would be an
elaborate farce. 338 In Gonzales v. Carhart, the constitutionality of
the Act depended on whether the ban on the specific procedure would
existing fundamental rights grounds. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 797.
333 See Bloche, supra note 20, at 994.
334 Brief for the Cato Inst., supra note 237, at 9.
131 Id. at 10.
336 Robertson, supra note 1, at 23.
337 See Brief for the Cato Inst., supra note 237, at 5.
338 Lamprecht v. F.C.C., 958 F.2d 382, 392 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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subject women to significant health risks.339 When Congress passed
the bill, it included a dubious congressional finding of fact that the
procedure was never medically necessary to preserve a woman's
health.34 ° While the Court admitted there was medical uncertainty
over this particular issue, it also found that some of Congress' other
findings were "factually incorrect., 341 However, instead of critically
examining whether this finding was accurate, it simply gave
deference to Congress' decision, by popular vote, that the fact did
exist. 34 As a result, the Court erroneously deferred to Congress'
findings that were based on politics rather than medical science.
Even if congressional testimony regarding a particular
medical practice was completely neutral, Congress does not have the
context nor capacity to accurately weigh evidence gained from such
testimony.343 Congress is not an expert in the area of medical
practice regulation.344 Although Congress regularly handles diverse
issues with which it does not have specific expertise, it is examining
medical practices at an unusually microdetailed level.345  For
example, when Congress enacted the Clean Air Act, it required the
EPA to develop air quality standards.346 However, Congress left it up
to each state to specify how the state would meet those standards,
339 Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1635.
340 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, § 2(2), (5).
341 Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1636-38.
342 Id. at 1637. See Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 392 n.2 ("We know of no support... for the
proposition that if the constitutionality of a statute depends in part on the existence of certain
facts, a court may not review a legislature's judgment that the facts exist.").
343 Kassirer, supra note 16, at 1747.
344 See Brief for the Cato Inst., supra note 237, at 7.
345 Kassirer, supra note 16, at 1747.
346 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (2000 & Supp. IV).
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recognizing that each state's situation was unique. 347 In comparison,
the Act does not allow for this level of flexibility in application since
it completely bans an entire procedure, regardless of individual
patient circumstances. "Laws are blunt instruments that are of little
value" when applied to a particular patient's medical crisis.348 Courts
should, therefore, review congressional legislation that bans safe and
effective medical treatments with skepticism.
Finally, courts would likely continue to analyze constitutional
claims against agency decision making as they do today. Courts, not
agencies, are experts in constitutional matters. 349 As a result, courts
will not give deference to agency decisions that may infringe a
constitutional right. 350 However, courts generally will give agencies
deference in areas that involve complex, technical expertise.351
Courts will most likely grant deference to federal medical regulations
that are promulgated under a constitutional statute. However, courts
should limit administrative authority in this area when the
government merely. has legitimate grounds for banning "safe and
effective medical treatments. '352
IV. A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
SAFE AND EFFECTIVE MEDICAL TREATMENTS
In order to prevent unnecessary congressional interference
with the medical treatment options available to patients, the Supreme
14' 42 U.S.C. § 74 10(a) (2000 & Supp. IV).
348 Drazen, supra note 21, at 178.
349 Califano, 592 F.2d at 780 n.15.
350 Id. at 780.
31 Id. at780n.15.
352 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 16.
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Court should recognize that a patient has a fundamental right to
submit to safe and effective medical treatments as recommended by
his physician's reasonable medical judgment to preserve his life or
health. The Due Process Clause's protection of "liberty" and "life"
both support this right. Therefore, the government must narrowly
tailor any laws infringing on this fundamental right to meet a
compelling government interest. This recognition is important not
only to prevent the federal government from impermissibly
interfering with a patient's ability to access current medically-
accepted modalities, but also to ensure the availability of future
treatments. Under this solution, courts would subject a congressional
ban on therapeutic cloning to strict scrutiny once the modality was
deemed safe and effective.
A. How Would Strict Scrutiny Apply to a Ban on
Therapeutic Cloning?
The right as described only applies to safe and effective
medical treatments.353 Therefore, the government could continue to
regulate future treatments which have not yet been "medically
accepted" with only a rational basis review, even if the Court did
recognize this right as fundamental. Under rational basis review, a
court would likely uphold a ban against therapeutic cloning before it
was deemed safe and effective because the government could likely
proffer legitimate safety interests for the ban. If Congress enacted
such a ban under these circumstances, patients would not have access
to therapeutic cloning treatments until they were proven safe and
353 See supra Part VA.I.
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effective. As discussed above, scientific evidence of safety and
efficacy would have to come from foreign research if the United
States passed a comprehensive ban.354 However, assuming that data
was available proving that therapeutic cloning was safe and effective,
a party could bring a constitutional challenge against the ban.355 As a
fundamental right, courts must therefore review the ban using strict
scrutiny.
1. What Interests Might the Government
Proffer, and are These Interests Compelling?
There are two categories of interests the government would
likely proffer as justification for a ban against therapeutic cloning.356
The first category involves traditional governmental health and safety
interests.357 The second category involves moralistic judgments
about both embryonic life and cloning in general.358 If therapeutic
cloning is safe and effective, none of these interests are compelling.
Just as with other experimental drug regulations, the
government's interest in protecting public health is important.3 5 9 The
FDA performs a cost-benefit analysis when it reviews new drugs for
approval; if the drug is unsafe or ineffective compared to the
354 See supra text accompanying notes 262-69. In addition, the FDA already tends to
approve drugs that are approved elsewhere, which indicates the agency does utilize medical
and scientific evidence generated in foreign countries. See Steenburg, supra note 269, at
324.
355 See supra text accompanying notes 265-71 regarding the potential hurdles of
demonstrating therapeutic cloning was safe and effective after the enactment of a flat ban.
356 See, e.g., H.R. 2564, 110th Cong. (2007).
357 See id.
358 See id.
359 Korobkin, supra note 39, at 184.
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potential benefit to the patient, the agency may deny approval.36 °
However, if therapeutic cloning is deemed safe and effective, then the
government's health and safety interests would cease to be
compelling. 361 Furthermore, in the case of a cloning ban, it is clear
that the government is not restricting access because it is truly
concerned about safety and efficacy.362
The primary motivation behind comprehensive cloning bans
is actually premised on a particular viewpoint that finds the
technology involved in therapeutic cloning to be immoral.363 The
current technology utilized to harvest embryonic stem cells results in
the destruction of the source embryo, regardless of whether the
embryo is fertilized naturally or cloned.364 Some members of
Congress and the Executive Branch have indicated that the protection
of embryos is a paramount government interest.365 This viewpoint
places great value in the potential life of the embryo.366 Others have
argued the government's real concern is a general repugnance for
cloning technologies, since the "potential life" argument is generally
ignored in regards to excess embryos destroyed after fertility
360 Id.
361 Id. at 187.
362 Id. at 184.
363 Id. at 179.
364 Korobkin, supra note 39, at 163.
365 See 152 CONG. REc. H5216 (2005) (statement of Rep. Weldon) ("You don't need to
destroy embryos. You don't have to use taxpayer dollars for the destruction of human life.");
Press Release, The White House, President Discusses Stem Cell Research Policy (July 19,
2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060719-3.html ("Yet we must
also remember that embryonic stem cells come from human embryos that are destroyed for
their cells. Each of these human embryos is a unique human life with inherent dignity and
matchless value.").
366 Goldberg, supra note 70, at 306-07.
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treatments.367 There are those who also argue that therapeutic
cloning will impermissibly lead to reproductive cloning. 368 All of
these arguments are based on moral viewpoints that are not shared by
all people.
Although the "culture of life" is a powerful force in politics
and law today,369 it simply cannot provide a compelling interest to
warrant a ban on medically-accepted treatments that benefit the
existing population.370 Assigning legal rights to an embryo merely
because it has human DNA does not justify depriving existing
humans of safe and effective treatments.37' In Lawrence, morality
alone was insufficient to meet a review that was something more than
rational basis review.37 If morality cannot meet that level of review,
then it certainly cannot meet the higher compelling standard under
strict scrutiny. It has been said that "one person's disgust, even with
government support, should not override another's fundamental
right."373 This is particularly important when moral intuitions may
indicate unfamiliarity or prejudice, as in the case of human cloning. 374
A ban on therapeutic cloning based on a desire to protect embryonic
life or express repugnance toward cloning would likely not survive
under a strict scrutiny standard of review.
367 Id.
368 See, e.g., H.R. 2564, 1 10th Cong. (2007).
369 Robertson, supra note 1, at 1.
370 Even the majority in Gonzales accepted that the government could not prohibit a
woman from obtaining a pre-viability abortion. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1626.
371 Robertson, supra note 1, at 23.
372 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
373 Korobkin, supra note 39, at 188.
374 Id. at 172.
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2. Is a Comprehensive Ban on Therapeutic
Cloning Narrowly Tailored?
Assuming that the Court did find that safety concerns or
protection of potential embryonic life were compelling government
interests, the Court must consider whether the law is narrowly
tailored to meet these interests. A review of one proposed ban on
therapeutic cloning provides insight of what one might expect in a
future law.375  The proposal bans all performances, attempted
performances, or participation in human cloning as well as the
shipment, receipt, or importation of the product of human cloning
"for any purpose." 376  Proper consideration of this proposal
demonstrates it is not narrowly tailored to meet either of the likely
proffered government interests.
In regards to safety concerns, this proposal makes no
provision for use or importation of therapeutic cloning treatments
once they are deemed safe and effective.377 Restrictions may be
appropriate before the treatment is medically accepted, just as with
other experimental drugs. However, once the treatment is proved
safe and effective using standard criteria, safety reasons no longer
provide justification for a complete ban. This does not mean that
patients must have unregulated access; the government could place
some restrictions on use if warranted by medical facts. However, a
ban that does not permit even the hope of using the treatment once
safe and effective is too broad and is not narrowly tailored.
... See H.R. 2564, 110th Cong. (2007).
376 id.
377 See Goldberg, supra note 70, at 306 n.3.
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This law is also not narrowly tailored to support an interest in
protecting embryonic life. The primary argument in this regard is
that the ban is underinclusive. Under a rational basis review, it may
be acceptable that this proposal does not ban all procedures, such as
in vitro fertilization ("IVF"), that result in the destruction of
embryos. 378  However, under strict scrutiny, failing to ban the
disposition of spare embryos after IVF is suspect.379 If therapeutic
cloning is banned because it destroys embryos, then it is illogical not
to also ban the destruction of embryos created through IVF
procedures.
Furthermore, a flat ban is not narrowly tailored to eliminate
the risk that therapeutic cloning may impermissibly lead to
reproductive cloning. This is easily demonstrated by comparing the
language of a flat ban with other proposed laws. A flat ban from the
United States House of Representatives defines "human cloning" to
mean using somatic cell nuclear transfer to create a living organism
"at any stage of development., 380 This clearly includes the creation
of cloned embryos for use in therapeutic cloning. In comparison, a
proposed law from the United States Senate defines "human cloning"
to mean only when a cloned embryo is actually implanted into a
uterus.381 This bill would prohibit reproductive cloning, but would
not ban therapeutic cloning since those embryos are not implanted
into a uterus. A comprehensive, flat ban including therapeutic
378 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955) (articulating
the Court's standard for rational basis review).
379 See Goldberg, supra note 70, at 312.
380 H.R. 2564, 110th Cong. (2007).
381 S. Res. 812, 110th Cong. (2007).
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cloning is therefore not narrowly tailored to meet a particular moral
view regarding cloning or the potentiality of embryos, nor is it
narrowly tailored for safety concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal regulation of medical practice occurs at both the
legislative and agency levels.382 Current judicial practice gives a
great deal of deference to these regulations in the absence of potential
infringements on fundamental rights.383However, federal regulations
that broadly restrict the availability of a medically-accepted treatment
based on non-medical grounds pose a threat to the health and well-
being of individual citizens. A flat ban on therapeutic cloning is an
example of how such legislation could risk a patient's health well
into the future. Although the Supreme Court has recognized some
fundamental rights in the area of medicine,384 it has not yet
recognized a right for a patient to submit to safe and effective
treatments to preserve her life or health on the recommendation of
her physician's reasonable medical judgment. The courts should
declare that this right is fundamental and cease to defer to political
congressional fact-finding in such situations. Only then will
Congress stop making unqualified, moralistic forays into the practice
of medicine.
382 See Kassirer, supra note 16, at 1747.
383 See Pryor, 240 F.3d at 948.
384 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
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